

Cybersecurity Concerns for Facilities

MSBO Annual Meeting

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Introductions & Objectives

- Learn how common systems can be compromised
- Understand how best to protect against intrusion
- Hear case studies of what can happen when systems are attacked
- Things to discuss with your techs & vendors

Reasons for Concern

- Potential Liability
- Legal Requirements
- District Reputation
- Professional Reputation
- Staff and Student Records
- Monetary losses
- Loss of data (Key records, HVAC, logs, etc)
- Disruption of Services - virtual can affect physical

Data Breaches in Education

How




Figure 5. Patterns in breaches (n=5,275)

People

Who




Figure 16. Top threat actor varieties in breaches (n=2,277)

Internet

What





Figure 26. Top Hacking vectors in breaches (n=1,610)

**Attackers
generally
follow these
steps to
compromise
an
organization
- Any entry
point will be
used.**



Essential Cybersecurity Practices for K12



Produced by METL,
a workgroup of MAISA

Created for Michigan Schools

By Michigan K-12 technology experts



Basic

- 1 Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets
- 2 Inventory and Control of Software Assets
- 3 Continuous Vulnerability Management
- 4 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
- 5 Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations and Servers
- 6 Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs

Foundational

- 7 Email and Web Browser Protections
- 8 Malware Defenses
- 9 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
- 10 Data Recovery Capabilities
- 11 Secure Configuration for Network Devices, such as Firewalls, Routers and Switches
- 12 Boundary Defense
- 13 Data Protection
- 14 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
- 15 Wireless Access Control
- 16 Account Monitoring and Control

Organizational

- 17 Implement a Security Awareness and Training Program
- 18 Application Software Security
- 19 Incident Response and Management
- 20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

**CIS V8 Controls have recently been reduced to 18.*

Basic CIS Controls

1. Inventory and Control of **Hardware** Assets

a. What physical equipment do you have

1. Inventory and Control of **Software** Assets

a. What software is running on your hardware

1. Continuous **Vulnerability** Management

a. Who is patching/updating

Basic CIS Controls

4. Controlled Use of **Administrative Privileges**

a. Who has the master keys

5. Secure **Configuration** for Hardware and Software

a. Change the default passwords. No direct Internet access (behind VPN, remote mgt tool)

6. Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of **Audit Logs**

a. How far back can you tell who accessed what and when

TOTAL RESULTS

21

TOP COUNTRIES



United States

21

TOP SERVICES

HTTP	6
HTTPS	4
8001	3
HTTP (8080)	3
HTTPS (8443)	3

TOP ORGANIZATIONS

Merit Network	21
---------------	----

TOP PRODUCTS

Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine	8
Squid http proxy	7
Microsoft IIS httpd	2
lighttpd	2
Mongrel httpd	1

New Service: Keep track of what you have connected to the Internet. Check out [Shodan Monitor](#)

Merit Network

Added on 2020-09-03 13:20:42 GMT

United States, Clare

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.30

Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

Transfer-Encoding: chunked

Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2020 13:20:40 GMT

Server: lighttpd/1.4.32

American Auto-Matrix

Merit Network

Added on 2020-09-03 00:06:24 GMT

United States, Saint Johns

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Transfer-Encoding: chunked

X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.8

Content-type: text/html

Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2020 00:06:12 GMT

Server: lighttpd/1.4.18

Student and Parent Sign In

Merit Network

Added on 2020-09-07 07:39:13 GMT

United States, Clare

Technologies

SSL Certificate

Issued By:

- Common Name: Gandi Standard SSL

CA 2

- Organization: Gandi

Issued To:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

Supported SSL Versions

TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1

Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=0001600EA05841B98975070308CC012; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Cache-control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, check=0

Expires: Thu, 01 Dec 1994 16:...

Merit Network

Added on 2020-09-06 21:08:09 GMT

United States, Clare

SSL Certificate

Issued By:

- Common Name: Gandi Standard SSL

CA 2

- Organization: Gandi

Issued To:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

- Common Name:

Supported SSL Versions

TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1

Content-Length: 0

Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2020 21:08:09 GMT

The screenshot shows the Shodan web interface. At the top is a navigation bar with tabs like 'Shodan', 'Developers', 'Monitor', and 'View All...'. Below this is a search bar containing 'pool.giresd.edzone.net' and a red magnifying glass icon. To the right of the search bar are links for 'Explore', 'Downloads', 'Reports', 'Pricing', and 'Enterprise Access'. A satellite map of Saint John's, Newfoundland, is displayed below the search bar. On the right side of the map, there is a sidebar with sections for 'Ports' (showing port 80) and 'Services' (showing http). Below the map, there is a table of hostnames and their associated IP addresses. The bottom section of the page lists several CVE vulnerabilities related to PHP and FPM.

City	Saint Johns
Country	United States
Organization	Merit Network
ISP	Merit Network
Last Update	2020-09-03T00:06:24.633929
Hostnames	pool.giresd.edzone.net
ASN	AS2882

Vulnerabilities

Note: the device may not be impacted by all of these issues. The vulnerabilities are implied based on the software and version.

- CVE-2018-10549** An issue was discovered in PHP before 5.6.36, 7.0.x before 7.0.30, 7.1.x before 7.1.17, and 7.2.x before 7.2.5. exif_read_data in ext/exif/exif.c has an out-of-bounds read for crafted JPEG data because exif_if_add_value mishandles the case of a MakerNote that lacks a final '\0' character.
- CVE-2018-10548** An issue was discovered in PHP before 5.6.36, 7.0.x before 7.0.30, 7.1.x before 7.1.17, and 7.2.x before 7.2.5. ext/ldap/ldap.c allows remote LDAP servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) because of mishandling of the ldap_get_dn return value.
- CVE-2018-10545** An issue was discovered in PHP before 5.6.35, 7.0.x before 7.0.29, 7.1.x before 7.1.16, and 7.2.x before 7.2.4. Dumpable FPM child processes allow bypassing opcode access controls because fpm_unix.c makes a PR_SET_DUMPABLE prctl call, allowing one user (in a multiuser environment) to obtain sensitive information from the process memory of a second user's PHP applications by running gcore on the PID of the PHP-FPM

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- CVE-2018-10547** An issue was discovered in `ext/phar/phar_object.c` in PHP before 5.6.36, 7.0.x before 7.0.30, 7.1.x before 7.1.17, and 7.2.x before 7.2.5. There is Reflected XSS on the PHAR 403 and 404 error pages via request data of a request for a .phar file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-5712.
- CVE-2018-10546** An issue was discovered in PHP before 5.6.36, 7.0.x before 7.0.30, 7.1.x before 7.1.17, and 7.2.x before 7.2.5. An infinite loop exists in `ext/iconv/iconv.c` because the `iconv` stream filter does not reject invalid multibyte sequences.
- CVE-2008-5557** Heap-based buffer overflow in `ext/mbstring/libmbfl/filters/mbfilter_htmlent.c` in the `mbstring` extension in PHP 4.3.0 through 5.2.6 allows context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted string containing an HTML entity, which is not properly handled during Unicode conversion, related to the (1) `mb_convert_encoding`, (2) `mb_check_encoding`, (3) `mb_convert_variables`, and (4) `mb_parse_str` functions.
- CVE-2013-4559** `lighttpd` before 1.4.33 does not check the return value of the (1) `setuid`, (2) `setgid`, or (3) `setgroups` functions, which might cause `lighttpd` to run as root if it is restarted and allows remote attackers to gain privileges, as demonstrated by multiple calls to the `clone` function that cause `setuid` to fail when the user process limit is reached.
- CVE-2011-2202** The `rfc1867_post_handler` function in `main/rfc1867.c` in PHP before 5.3.7 does not properly restrict filenames in multipart/form-data POST requests, which allows remote attackers to conduct absolute path traversal attacks, and possibly create or overwrite arbitrary files, via a crafted upload request, related to a "file path injection vulnerability."
- CVE-2014-5459** The `PEAR_REST` class in `REST.php` in `PEAR` in PHP through 5.6.0 allows local users to write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on a (1) `rest.cachefile` or (2) `rest.cacheid` file in `/tmp/pear/cache/`, related to the `retrieveCacheFirst` and `useLocalCache` functions.
- CVE-2009-4143** PHP before 5.2.12 does not properly handle session data, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors related to (1) interrupt corruption of the `SESSION` superglobal array and (2) the `session.save_path` directive.
- CVE-2012-2311** `sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c` in PHP before 5.3.13 and 5.4.x before 5.4.3, when configured as a CGI script (aka `php-cgi`), does not properly handle query strings that contain a `%3D` sequence but no `=` (equals sign) character, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by placing command-line options in the query string, related to lack of skipping a certain `php_getopt` for the 'd' case. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2012-1823.

Server: lighttpd/1.4.18



Matrix™



Username

Password



american auto-matrix aspect ft default username password



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Settings Tools

SafeSearch on

About 3,500,000 results (0.51 seconds)

alpscontrols.com > prod_data > new_pdfs > AAMATRIX PDF

Nexus Hardware Installation Guide.book - Alps Controls

and AspectFT-Enterprise are trademarks of **American Auto-Matrix**. ... The AspectFT-Nexus and AspectFT-Facility is shipped with a **default IP** address and subnet mask. ... When referencing Calendars in **Aspect Studio**, these credentials must be ...
Missing: ft | Must include: ft

www.aamatrix.com > products > aspect-nexus

NEXUS Series - American Auto-Matrix

The NEXUS is an IoT (Internet of Things) embedded **ASPECT**® Control ... Additionally, TCP/IP communications using **FT/Net**, **BACnet**®, **Modbus**® and ... Serial Interfaces, 2 x RS-485@ 9K6, 19K2, 38K4, 57K6, 76K8 or 115K2 (**default** 38K4).

www.aamatrix.com > table > training > Page-2

Training | Table | Page 2 - American Auto-Matrix

The **Aspect** Advanced workshop builds on the knowledge gained from the **Aspect** Basic workshop, and project building field experience, ... Engineering Center, Review of setting **BACnet IP** settings within UEC ... **Default** Addressing discussion.
Missing: ft | Must include: ft

aamatrix.com

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
Building Automation, HVAC and Energy Control leader with over 35 years of industry experience.
Missing: ft | Must include: ft

www.cylon-automatrix.com > products > aspect

ASPECT - American Auto-Matrix

ASPECT is an award-winning scalable building energy management and ... Limit and **Default** Improvement; **ASPECT** Alarm Console; Up to 45 exceptions ...


schmid-net.com > american-auto-matrix



2.3 LOG-IN

To log-in to the AspectFT-Nexus and AspectFT-Facility:

1. With your PC's network card configured, open any standard web browser.
2. Browse to the default IP address (192.168.1.251) of your AspectFT-Nexus and AspectFT-Facility.
3. If your connection is successful, you should be greeted with the main page of the Facility, requiring username and password entry.
4. Enter the case-sensitive default username (*aamuser*) and password (*default*) into the fields provided.
5. Click the *Log In* button.



AMERICAN
AUTO-MATRIX
SMART BUILDING SOLUTIONS™

Nexus™

ASPECT

Username

Password

Figure 2-1 AspectFT-Nexus and AspectFT-Facility Log-In



Matrix™



Username

Password



Matrix™



- Aspect Control Panel
 - Application
 - Users and Groups
 - Groups
 - Users**
 - Calendar Configuration
 - Calendar File
 - Calendar User
 - Mobile
 - Licensing
 - Communication Setup
 - OOS Manager
 - Port Configuration
 - PUP
 - BACnet
 - Modem Configuration
 - System Administration
 - System Services
 - System Status
 - Process Status
 - License Item Status
 - Project Performance
 - System Updates
 - Backup/Restore
 - Persistence Manager
 - Project Removal
 - Project Source
 - Ethernet Settings
 - Network Diagnostics
 - Time Settings
 - Web Server Configuration
 - Acknowledgements
 - System Logs

User Manager

Add, edit, and delete users.

[Add User](#) | [Print Users](#)

User	Groups	Delete
aamuser	MIXAdmin	<input type="checkbox"/>
aamuser	MIXAdmin	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="button" value="Delete"/>		



← → ↺ 🏠 Not secure | [redacted] cgi-bin/sri_config.cgi?pr

Apps ★ Work Home News Agendas

Please click Update button after making a change

Board IP Settings

Hostname

☐ DHCP
☒ Static

IP Settings

IP Address

Subnet mask

Default gateway

☐ Obtain DNS Server Address Automatically
☒ Manually Configure DNS Server Address

DNS Server Address Setting

Primary DNS

Secondary DNS

☒ Enable Ether Link Auto Negotiation

CIM IP Address Setting

IP Address or Hostname

Port Number

VSRC Lock (Relay 1) Configuration

Comm. Failure

- during MRO

☐ Retain State
☐ Unlocked
☒ Locked

Power On

☐ Unlocked
☒ Locked

Update

Display

VSRC Lock (Relay 1) Configuration

Comm. Failure

- during MRO

☐ Retain State
☐ Unlocked
☒ Locked

Power On

☐ Unlocked
☒ Locked

Update

Display

Basic CIS Controls

1. Inventory and Control of **Hardware** Assets
2. Inventory and Control of **Software** Assets
3. Continuous **Vulnerability** Management
4. Controlled Use of **Administrative** Privileges
5. Secure **Configuration** for Hardware and Software
6. Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of **Audit Logs**

Control 1: Hardware Control

- What servers, workstations and devices do you have that control Facilities and are critical to daily operations?
- Are these physically secured? Who can get at them?
- Who is regularly maintaining them? How often?

Steps to Take:

- Keep accurate **asset lists** and **point of contact**
- Ensure **physical security**
- **Regularly** review and update this list

Control 2: Software Control

- Can you easily identify and report on the software versions running on your Facilities Systems?
- When was the last time you updated the Operating System or software version?

Steps to Take:

- Keep accurate **software lists**
- **Remove the ability** for local software installs
- Know **who** is responsible for maintaining each system

Control 3: Vulnerability Management

- Are your systems operating systems and software up-to-date?
- Is antivirus or malware detection enabled on the system?
- Are there systems you simply cannot update?

Steps to Take:

- Ensure vendors or your IT department are keeping your systems patched and updated.
- Set up a schedule to scan your systems or at least check for updates.
- Isolate old/vulnerable systems from the network

Control 4: Admin Accounts

- Is the password for your account the default?
- Is your Admin account secure? Longer is better!
- Can you access the interface via a web search or sticky note?
- **Steps to Take:**
 - Keep **audited** inventory of admin accounts
 - **Change default passwords**
 - **Use dedicated computers and accounts** for administrative tasks in conjunction with **two-factor authentication** where possible.

Control 5: Secure Configurations

- Did anyone review the system before deployment?
- How are you/vendors accessing the site remotely?

Steps to Take:

- Regularly **review** list of vendors with external access
- Enable VPN users access **only when needed to complete work** (Work with your IT staff to maintain a secure perimeter.)

Control 6: Audit Logs

- Can you **fully** recreate events to aid in troubleshooting and incident response?
- **Steps to Take:**
 - Enable **detailed logging** in software as well as on all servers and workstations
 - Create **alerts** to notify Facilities and IT staff on suspicious activity.
 - **Ask questions** about log entries

Suggestions

Schedule regular checkups & audits

Talk to your techs regularly

How can we do this securely?

Review logs regularly & investigate

Suggestion for Bids / Working with Vendors to Secure Systems on Day 1

- Add language to RFP/RFB regarding security
 - Two factor authentication, secure remote access
 - Software updates/maintaining a secure configuration
- No open /backdoor access from the Internet
- Anti-virus compatibility
- Consider inviting IT dept to review for information security concerns

Suggestion for Bids / Working with Vendors to Secure Systems on Day 1

Ensure your business office has the correct vendor information!!!

A district in Michigan fell victim to a wire transfer fraud. Hackers exploited district by posing as the winning bidder and requesting payment. A six figure sum was wired to the hackers bank account.

Credits & contacts

Matt McMahon

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Joel Phillips

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Merri Lynn Colligan

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David Larson

davidlarson@livingstonesa.org

MiSecure

<http://www.misecure.org/>

2021 Data Breach Investigation <https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/dbir/>